Perhaps one of the most entertaining developments in waiver history was the creation of IPMG’s “Insync” provider selection tool.  The purpose of this was to allow consumers to review provider qualifications and make a decision without consulting the long provider-list that offered no real information about providers.  It also promised to connect providers with consumers by showing consumers which providers wanted to serve them.

The actual product, a generic database product from Intuit, left much to be desired.  The Insync system managed to give providers almost no information at all about the consumer (confidentiality) while asking the provider to indicate how interested they are in providing services.  This is done, literally, by rating their interest on a scale from “not interested” through “very interested”.  A common joke among providers is openly wondering how many referrals a provider would get if they were “somewhat interested” in serving an individual.  The Insync system lost much of its support when providers found out that if there was not a minimum number of interested providers, the system was scrapped and the pick-list was used.  Regardless, providers must use whatever tools are available, so Insync is still monitored on a daily basis, even though (in my area) there have been no consumers listed in months.

There was quite a bit of concern in the provider community at the beginning of 2008.  In spite of the assurance that stakeholder input would be a key component of the development of the new waiver system, the absence of information was so profound that the rumor mill took over.  Providers began sending people to provider meetings in the “pilot” regions of the state.  Any gap in information was quickly filled by speculation.  Families were terrified that services that they depended upon would be gone forever.  When they called their local ARC affiliates for information, they were told that there was no information to give.

A letter was released by the DDRS director in the middle of this confusion, to assure families and providers who were concerned that sheltered work was being limited that this was not the case.  The letter expressed anger at providers for creating this rumor, openly accusing them of inventing it to frighten families.  The self-congratulatory letter also reminded the recipients that DDRS was completely open and inclusive of ideas from stakeholders.  Finally, it listed mutual accomplishments that included the creation of a DSP training program, crisis services, outreach services, and improvements to the case management system.  As of this posting, all of these accomplishments have been eliminated.

In September of 2008, after many cost reports, questions, and revisions, the Day Services definitions and rates were released.  Originally, the state wished to use the same methodology for day services as it did for residential- using the staff hour as the unit of reimbursement, with the cost split between all consumers present with the DSP at the time of the billing.  Providers objected, as such a system would reduce consumer choice by forcing all consumers in a group to stay with that group.  The state responded by dividing the staff/hour unit of service into discrete, ratio-based units of service.  This greatly increased the consumers’ ability to choose different activities and services, but required providers to track ratios every 15 minutes to determine the appropriate billing code.  The increased documentation and tracking required to verify that a service was appropriately billed let to significant cost increases in providing the service.

2009 Marked the official launch of the short-lived OASIS program.  From the moment that the first allocations were released, it was apparent that something was very, very wrong.  The “black box,” or secret formula for assigning dollars based on consumer need seemed to be operating on an entirely different wavelength than what was expected by families, providers, and even employees of the state.  Large swings were noted, awarding huge increases in authorizations to people who did not need them and cutting services to individuals who could not safely live with such a reduction.  After a few weeks of embarrassing anecdotes from families and heartfelt letters from providers and advocates, OASIS was frozen by the secretary of FSSA, pending investigation into the methodology of the allocation method.  March or 2009 locked in authorizations at the previous year’s amounts, but continued to roll forward with the Uniform Rate Methodology that was based on the OASIS allocation method.  The result was a hybrid of old allocations and new ways to bill services.  In short, it was a system that would limp along until something better came along.

“Something better” did not come along for quite a while.  The complications of uniform rate methodology and ratio-based billing added significant costs to service delivery, while the revenue side of the equation remained in limbo.  Agencies, Families, and consumers agreed then, as now, that there must be an objective system for allocating resources.  Even with all of the challenges to date, there is no other rational solution.  A transparent, logical, and reliable system that is understood and held valid by all stakeholders is certainly worth the wait for its development.

And wait we did.  There has been any number of advisory panels and work groups called in by DDRS to develop such a system.  Candid feedback was requested and freely given.  Providers and consumers met together at agencies to brainstorm and develop ideas, and these were sent to advisors to be discussed at DDRS forums.  It appeared that this was going to be a mutually agreed upon plan that worked for the state, for consumers, and providers alike.

Part 7 will draw this history to a close and describe the current state of the Waiver.  Until then…

 

Things were quiet for the first part of 2003.  After the flurry of activity surrounding the waiver, case management, waiting lists, and protocols, it was a welcome break in the action.  Things were certainly complicated.  The tendency to clarify and re-clarify how services should be provided and billed added several layers of documentation to the process, and administrative support staff were added at most agencies to pull together the information needed to assure compliance.  The cost of providing services through the waiver was going up.

Case Management was getting to be a very challenging program to operate.  As the “hub” of the service wheel, it was determined that all case managers required provider numbers to bill for their services.  Providers, very new to the Medicaid model, were given detailed instructions on how to bring their case managers into compliance with the new system.  As case management was a critical service component, dutifully filled out the forms, reorganized, and assured that their case managers were fully trained to comply with all of the new requirements.  It was important to do so, because having case management on site assured that there was a quick response to changing consumer needs.  Providers heard anecdotally that so-called “Outside” case managers did not know the consumers well, and were slow to act when service changes were requested.

By 2004, it was clear that things were changing again.  The numbers were in, and in spite of regular pressure to reduce costs, the added paperwork and infrastructure continued to increase costs.  Providers were aggressively defending the rates they were paid, as with each added clarification from the state, expense was added for providers.  CETA was eliminated altogether, and Community based individual habilitation, once the preferred service by the state under title XX, was capped at 25 hours per month.

In Mid-2004, the State announced that providers of residential services could no longer be case managers.  This was a devastating prospect to providers, as all of the time and expense of hiring and training a competent case management department was wasted.  Many providers, including my agency, decided to maintain their employees as internal coordinators, knowing that an outside entity could not deliver the level of service that our consumers had come to expect.  This choice proved to be a good one, as the next generation of case managers (with a few notable exceptions) absolutely failed to meet consumer needs.

The term “matrix” came into use on a regular basis, with the idea of using an objective method to determine how services are authorized.  Providers were (and still are) in favor of this, and were excited about the possibility of working together to develop the tools to make this concept a reality.  The implementation date for “matrix” was set for June of 2005.  For providers, this year of waiting for matrix was one of the most difficult we had faced.  Regular communications from the state added documentation requirements and decreased revenue steadily.  The Outside Case Managers were every bit as slow to respond as anticipated, and things like 15 minute documentation made service delivery an administrative nightmare.  Staff were re-deployed with time built in where they were not serving consumers, so that they could complete the paperwork each day.

Of course, the launch-date in 2005 was missed, with Matrix still in the planning stages.  An independent firm, called Arbitre, was employed to develop and implement an assessment tool (called ICAP) starting with residents of the Fort Wayne Developmental Center.  Many an eyebrow was raised when a psychologist researched the ICAP tool and found it an unreliable assessment, but the state could not be dissuaded from using it.

This issue was moot by August 2005, however, because the governor announced a new system, called “annual contract” that would reduce the administrative burden.  The Governor stated that things like 15 minute recording was an “administrative nightmare.”  David Gootee was hired to manage the transition to this system.

Providers were very concerned about the annual plan model.  First, it combined many elements that were separately billable into a single rate.  Providers that had, for example, hired an extensive nursing staff to provide healthcare coordination, found themselves with staff that were no longer reimbursable.  They became “the cost of doing business.”  Also, there was an obvious problem with the blending of many services into one rate- providers would no longer be able to show the connection between service delivery and outcomes, a known CMS issue.

These concerns fell on deaf ears, however, and the annual contract plan launched- without the matrix tool, and without a way for providers to justify service levels.  Most providers continued to document services in units, because we were sure that this information would be demanded once the annual rate idea fell out of favor.  Again, we were right.

And so began the per diem billing methodology, and the changing of the service model to meet the new service definition.  This model was stable for a while, and in spite of our fears, providers changed almost every aspect of service delivery to meet the requirements of the new model.

The Per Diem billing was in place for a while, and things began to look up- like there may be a stable period to focus on best practices.

Next time, we will discuss the fall of the per diem, the reestablishment of 15 minute units, OASIS, and finally OBA.  Talk to you then…

 

I had the pleasure of attending the 2010 Arc Conference yesterday.  Not only was it great to reconnect with friends and to hear another John Dickerson blockbuster presentation, the magnitude of the ideas outlined by the Big Minds Group left me absolutely energized.  If you have not already done so, I strongly recommend paying a visit to the Arc’s Pathways Page to get a rundown.

This is not the first that I have heard of the “Pathways to Empowerment” initiative.  I have always been a fan, but I must admit that I was wondering what the ultimate call to action would be, and how it would fit into our current struggles as an industry.    I am happy to report that yesterday, my enthusiasm increased dramatically.

Our dual role, as a service provider and as an Arc Chapter, has been remarkably easy most of the time.  Indiana is very fortunate that in times long before me, the industry and the advocates decided to work as partners.  While the Pathways initiative may be frightening in some circles, I believe that most providers, families, and advocates will ultimately see the wisdom in moving in this direction.  There will be debate on many of the ideas to come, but the underlying facts will be hard to dispute:

1.  We have spent an ungodly amount of time and money arguing, complaining, tweaking, negotiating, and complying with the current system.  Perhaps the “system” itself needs some scrutiny.

2.  The Medicaid Waiver has been a blessing and a curse.

3.  The current system is the result of a lack of partnership between the state, providers, and consumers.  A fusion of competing agendas is not a partnership.  We need something new.

4.  Some consumers have more services authorized than they have the ability to use.  Others do not have nearly enough.

5.  The state needs to reduce what it spends, and providers cannot reduce their expenses any more without jeopardizing health and safety.

If these things are true, then the solution cannot come from yet another iteration of the current model.  It may get us by until the next time, but all of these issues will resurface over time.  The Pathways approach seeks to start a much needed conversation.  While providers can still be considered the core source for services, they can no longer be considered the core source for a meaningful life.  This must come from a blend of family, friends, work, community service, and service providers-the places that all of us turn to for meaning.

People have been throwing around the phrase “natural support” for a long time.  I think that many people, including providers and the state, interpret this as meaning “free service.”  There is no such thing as free service- someone always pays, even if it is the provider itself.  As John pointed out, shifting things out of a centralized rationing of limited resources and into a collaborative effort between many involved parties is where we need to be looking.  Finding that place should be the basis of our discussions.

In order to make such an effort work, however, there must be a few things in place.  First, there must be an adequate and immediately accessible crisis intervention system funded by the state, so that as new things are tried there is an underlying safety net.  Next, providers must be allowed the flexibility to provide services based on individual consumer need- Residential Habilitation may look entirely different from one individual to the next.  Finally, we must fully embrace the work-first model- we must start early, identify the talents of each individual, and assume from the start that each individual will have a place in the workforce- as an employee, a trainee, or a volunteer.

Above all, we must get these conversations going.  We must take a hard look at what is broken, and decide what can be repaired and what is simply defective.  Service providers are in no danger of disappearing.  We provide specialized services that are not easily replaced.  As the cost of providing these services is not likely to decrease, we must depend upon innovation and collaboration to fill in the gaps and work toward making the waiting list a thing of the past.  I look forward to the discussions to come!

© 2012 Christiaan's Perspective Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha